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Abstract
What is the impact of disease burden on democracy in sub-Saharan Africa?
Despite increasing interest in the implications of health crises for state stability,
there has been a dearth of literature exploring the relationship between disease
burden more generally and democracy specifically. This thesis takes a
comprehensive approach to bridge this gap in the literature. Using quantitative and
qualitative methods, it draws on data from the Global Burden of Disease database
and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset to analyze this relationship. The
diseases studied are categorized as long-wave (e.g., HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis),
short-wave (e.g., Ebola and lower respiratory infections), or endemic (e.g., malaria
and an aggregate of other infectious diseases). In terms of democracy, this thesis
focuses on civil liberties and civil society. Having utilized a linear regression,
controlling for economic variables, this study found a positive and significant
relationship between long-wave diseases and both civil liberties and civil society; a
negative and significant relationship between Ebola and both civil liberties and civil
society; a positive and significant relationship between lower respiratory infections
and both civil liberties and civil society; and, finally, a positive and significant
relationship between the other infectious disease aggregate and civil society.
Ultimately, there was no significant relationship between the other diseases studied
and the democratic variables. By identifying past relationships between particular
kinds of diseases and manifestations of democracy, we can establish a baseline from
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which to project our expectations about how emerging diseases like COVID-19 will
impact the practice of democracy.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Sub-Saharan Africa has long carried the largest infectious disease burden of
any region across the globe (Mboussou et al. 2019). The region faces both novel
outbreaks of disease, including human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and Ebola,
and outbreaks of re-emerging or endemic infectious diseases, such as cholera,
measles, and tuberculosis (Price-Smith 2002). Scholars suggest that there is a
“reciprocal spiral dynamic” between the proliferation of infectious disease and state
capacity, meaning that weak states can serve as breeding grounds for infectious
disease and said infectious diseases may have a negative impact on state capacity
(Patrick 2011: 207). In addition to facing a heightened disease burden, African
democracies have struggled since their independence to become fully consolidated
(Ng’oma 2016). Thus, young African democracies are still taking shape and may be
more susceptible to external shocks than their fully consolidated counterparts. The
intersection of disease prevalence and developing democratic regimes in this region
gives rise to a pertinent question: what is the impact of disease burden on
democracy in sub-Saharan Africa? Despite increasing interest in the implications of
health crises for state stability, there has been a dearth of literature exploring the
relationship between disease burden more generally and democracy specifically.
This thesis seeks to bridge the aforementioned gap in the literature and explore the
effects of disease burden on civil liberties and civil society, two core aspects of
democracy, in sub-Saharan African nations.
1

Though frequently explored, the concept of democracy is elusive and difficult
to define. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset has identified a handful of
core indices of democracy, which include “electoral, liberal, majoritarian,
consensual, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian” (Coppedge et al. 2020c: 4).
Each principle independently explores a specific facet of “rule by the people”
(Coppedge et al. 2020c: 4). The electoral principle is fundamental to the
understanding of democracy and examines a prominent value enshrined by
democracy – ensuring that governments are held accountable to the citizenry
through recurring elections (Coppedge et al. 2020c). However, the electoral principle
alone is not an accurate indicator of democracy, as many electoral autocracies exist
both across the African continent and around the world. Thus, this measure must
be taken in conjunction with the other six principles examined in the V-Dem data in
order to have a comprehensive understanding of what is required for a government
to be a democracy. The liberal value emphasizes the protection of individual and
minority rights from government tyranny or state repression (Coppedge et al.
2020c). The participatory value associated with democracy calls for direct, active
participation on the part of citizens across various political processes (Coppedge et
al. 2020c). The deliberative facet of democracy requires that decisions made in the
public interest should be informed by intentional, respectful, and rational dialogue
at all societal levels (Coppedge et al. 2020c). V-Dem’s egalitarian principle embodies
the ideal that all individuals should wield the same political influence and hold the
same rights and liberties (Coppedge et al. 2020c). The majoritarian principle
2

requires that a majority of the citizens be able to govern and impose their will via
policy (Coppedge et al. 2020c). Lastly, the consensual principle places value on the
voices of political minorities in recognition that diverse perspectives and interests
should all be represented and valued (Coppedge et al. 2020c). When considered
together, these seven principles provide a holistic conception of democracy as it is
understood today (Coppedge et al. 2020c).
More important for the purposes of this study are the lower-level indices, as
they flesh out the elements commonly associated with democracy, including efficacy
of local government, equality before the law, fairness of elections, and equal access
and distribution of resources (Coppedge et al. 2020c). This thesis assesses two
lower-level indices of democracy measured by the V-Dem dataset: civil liberties and
civil society. In considering civil liberties, V-Dem focuses on de facto, or actual,
practices instead of de jure rights enshrined by law or the constitution (Coppedge et
al. 2020b). V-Dem’s data for civil society focus on civil society organizations, namely
interest groups, civic-focused religious groups, labor unions, social movements,
professional organizations, and non-governmental organizations (Coppedge et al.
2020b). This definition specifically excludes businesses, political parties, spirituallyfocused religious organizations, and government agencies (Coppedge et al. 2020b).
An increased disease burden, particularly with regard to communicable
diseases, is expected to impact the strength of a democratic regime, but these
implications may vary depending on the type of disease. In his book Weak Links:

Fragile states, global threats, and international security, Stewart Patrick lays out
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three types of disease outbreaks, which will be used in this thesis to classify the
various diseases analyzed. These categories include long-wave pandemics, shortwave pandemics, and endemic diseases (Patrick 2011). While some of the diseases
studied in this thesis do not reach the threshold of “pandemic,” this framework can
still be useful in categorizing and understanding these different diseases and a
government’s response to them. Long-wave diseases will refer to the spread of a
particular disease over an extended period of time. These long-wave diseases could
potentially have higher mortality rates due to their longevity (Patrick 2011). This
thesis will focus on the two most prominent long-wave diseases facing sub-Saharan
Africa – HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. A short-wave disease will be defined as the
outbreak of a rapid-onset disease with a high transmissibility and mortality rate
(Patrick 2011). The short-wave diseases analyzed in this thesis will include Ebola
and lower respiratory infections like influenza. Finally, if a disease is endemic, its
prevalence rate is constant within a particular geographic area or population
(Center for Disease Control, hereafter CDC, 2012). Also included in this category
would be spikes in diseases endemic to an area. For the purposes of this study, that
would include diseases such as measles and malaria. By using these disease
classifications, we will obtain a more nuanced understanding of how different facets
of the disease burden may influence the two selected manifestations of democracy –
civil liberties and civil society.
Ultimately, this thesis finds that there is a positive and significant
relationship between long-wave diseases and both civil liberties and civil society; a
4

negative and significant relationship between Ebola and both civil liberties and civil
society; a positive and significant relationship between lower respiratory infections
and both civil liberties and civil society; and, finally, a positive and significant
relationship between the other infectious disease aggregate and civil society.

5

Chapter II: Literature Review
Securitization of Disease
To understand the relationship between disease and democracy, it is
essential to identify the variety of ways that governments may choose to respond to
crisis-like situations. According to Stefan Elbe (2006), there are two main ways in
which governments respond, either by politicizing a crisis or securitizing a crisis.
Politicization occurs when an issue is brought to light through public debate or is
incorporated into public policy, necessitating a public decision (Elbe 2006).
Securitization goes further, where the government frames the issue as an
existential threat to the nation and its residents; this framing may require
emergency measures and justify government actions which generally fall outside of
the purview of political institutions (Elbe 2006).
A securitization response can have serious implications for both civil liberties
and civil society. The emergency measures taken by the government can be
leveraged to infringe on civil liberties (Elbe 2006). Furthermore, securitization of a
disease like HIV/AIDS can remove agency from civil society organizations in favor
of less transparent methods of handling the disease, such as through military or
intelligence avenues (Elbe 2006). Thus, securitizing a disease such as HIV/AIDS or
Ebola could lead governmental leaders and institutions to take actions that will
affect the role of the people vis-à-vis the government. Government actions, such as
imposing lockdowns or curfews, may impede the work of civil society organizations
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and affect various other aspects of democracy, including participatory engagement,
fundamental rights, and impartial administration.
Expanding upon this securitization perspective, Andrew Price-Smith (2002)
analyzes the ways in which communicable diseases can pose a threat to security in
a section of his book The Health of Nations. Early on, Price-Smith takes a
quantitative look at the relationship between infant mortality and state capability
in 20 states — including Botswana, Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iceland,
India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Malawi, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Rwanda, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, and Uganda; he ultimately finds a
significant, negative relationship between the two variables (Price-Smith 2002).
More interesting for this thesis, however, is Price-Smith’s analysis of the
disease-security relationship. He bases his predictions, which are primarily
theoretical, upon his quantitative findings. Price-Smith argues that, in the interest
of maintaining state stability, ruling elites might crack down on political and social
opposition and introduce increasingly authoritarian measures (Price-Smith 2002).
These actions are more likely to result if the government adopts a securitization
framework, as they capitalize on this framework to justify responses that generally
fall outside the purview of political institutions (Elbe 2006). Some restrictions on
personal freedom may be deemed necessary to contain a disease, such as lockdowns
or bans on large social gatherings. However, when opportunistic politicians take
advantage of the situation, problems will arise.

7

Additionally, Price-Smith argues that declining rates of productivity,
economic prosperity, and overall well-being caused by disease proliferation can lead
to intra-societal competition and thus turbulence within a state (Price-Smith 2002).
This intra-societal competition, in addition to the reduced civic space caused by a
government’s response to the health crisis, may negatively impact the development
and engagement of civil society (Price-Smith 2002). The proliferation of infectious
disease, according to Price-Smith, would then threaten or destabilize developing
democracies that are still working to consolidate their democratic practices and
institutions.

State Fragility & Disease
In contrast to Price-Smith, Stewart Patrick (2011) argues that there is little
evidence that infectious disease may be a cause of political instability or state
fragility. Patrick focuses his discussion about infectious disease and state
fragility/failure on HIV/AIDS. This argument comes at a time when analysts began
to realize that their early predictions that HIV would significantly, and negatively,
impact governments remained unfulfilled. However, he still notes a handful of
possible causal pathways through which HIV/AIDS could increase state fragility or
risk of failure in weak states (Patrick 2011). The first is through economic
stagnancy and the impact of HIV/AIDS on labor and productivity (Patrick 2011).
According to Patrick, AIDS has also led to a decrease in foreign direct investment
because of reduced economic growth and productivity (Patrick 2011). Another
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pathway for HIV/AIDS to lead to state fragility is through heightened instability
and violence (Patrick 2011). AIDS-affected nations have seen a shift in
demographics, with high child mortality, a large number of youths, and a minute
population of older adults (Patrick 2011). According to Patrick, these demographic
changes are likely to heighten instability, as a large population of youth is
correlated with societal upheaval (Patrick 2011). However, it should be noted that
youth-heavy demographics are more pronounced in West Africa, where the HIV
prevalence rate is much lower than that of Southern African nations, so this
predicted mechanism may not be completely accurate. The final pathway identified
by analysts was that, in highly affected countries, HIV/AIDS could cause
governments to lose political legitimacy, as HIV/AIDS has been a burden on
national budgets and eroded state capabilities (Patrick 2011). Despite these
disheartening trends, there is little empirical evidence that ties HIV/AIDS directly
to state failure. Patrick argues that, due to the long-wave nature of HIV/AIDS,
adaptation and the adoption of preventative measures against HIV/AIDS have been
possible, allowing states to avoid the consequences of the disease outlined above
(Patrick 2011). In addition, billions of dollars in foreign assistance, far more than
has been seen for any other disease or social challenge, have likely had an impact
on various nations’ ability to adapt and adopt these measures.
In the same vein, Celina Menzel (2017) explores the outbreak of infectious
diseases and their impact on political stability. In her study, Menzel compares the
effects of Ebola, tuberculosis, and influenza on political stability. After employing
9

both quantitative and qualitative methods, Menzel found that each disease had a
different effect on political stability. The measure of political instability Menzel uses
is an aggregate which considers violent protests, seizing power through
extraconstitutional avenues, armed conflict, terrorism, social unrest, ethnic conflict,
and/or international tension (Menzel 2017). Ultimately, influenza was found to have
a small, but highly significant, negative correlation with political stability, while
tuberculosis was found to have no effect on political stability (Menzel 2017). Ebola
had the most interesting results, showing a small, but highly significant, positive
correlation with political stability (Menzel 2017).
Menzel provides a few speculative explanations for this relationship. She
argues that this positive relationship could be explained by the “conflict-cohesion
thesis,” under which external threats to security, like Ebola, increase in-group
cohesiveness – uniting society against a common external threat (Menzel 2017).
Another explanation for this relationship could be the securitization of the
international global health response (Menzel 2017). The securitization narrative
surrounding the international response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa
influenced national government responses to the crisis, creating an emphasis on
rapid action in terms of containment and surveillance (Menzel 2017).
Menzel’s study illuminates interesting findings regarding health crises and
political stability, but it does not shed light on the effect a health crisis may have on
a particular regime type or form of governance (e.g., democracy). The West African
Ebola outbreak, which Menzel focuses on, did lead to periods of political instability
10

throughout the crisis; however, these unstable periods may not have been reflected
quantitatively in fragility indexes, though they may have been significant at the
time. Regimes may respond to health crises like Ebola by adopting more
authoritarian measures, such as cracking down on dissent, as indicated by PriceSmith (2002). The adoption of authoritarian measures may not affect political
stability, but it will affect the relationship between a government and its people.

HIV/AIDS Pandemic & Civil Society
Although understanding the relationship between health crises and political
stability is useful for this investigation, it is essential to deepen this exploration and
delineate the array of consequences disease burdens may have for particular
regimes or government types. Two key actors in disease response, in addition to a
nation’s government, are the international community and civil society
organizations; both of these actors can play an influential role in maintaining,
improving, or worsening democratic performance. Kim Yi Dionne (2018) explores
the role of principal-agent relationships in the efficacy of foreign aid, focusing
primarily on AIDS in Eastern and Southern Africa. Dionne argues that there is a
fundamental disconnect between both international and national responses to AIDS
and the actual priorities of individuals living in AIDS-affected nations (Dionne
2018).
From her findings, she concludes that international interventions, which
generally provide earmarked foreign aid to African governments, are undemocratic,

11

as they tend to ignore the priorities of the nation’s citizens (Dionne 2018). Further,
Dionne argues that this runs counter to the West’s efforts to promote democratic
consolidation in the region because it creates a bureaucracy that is unresponsive to
the priorities and needs of its citizens (Dionne 2018). Regardless, this aid could still
allow governments to invest in programs that align more closely with the citizens’
needs. One should also consider the impact preexisting foreign aid programs may
have had on these outcomes. For example, in Malawi, the country Dionne focuses
on, new HIV infections annually have declined significantly – from about 115,000 to
40,000 between about 1993 and 2020 – largely as a result of foreign aid programs
such as the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, contributing about 49%
of the total resources available to fight AIDS in the country (PEPFAR) (PEPFAR
2020a).
Scholar Henry Wambuii (2006) takes a different approach to understanding
AIDS response by looking at the role played by civil society, focusing specifically on
Kenya. He argues that AIDS has furthered the process of democratization in Kenya
because it has reconfigured the relationship between the state and civil society from
one that is adversarial in nature to one that is cooperative, thereby increasing
participatory engagement and increasing government responsiveness to its people
(Wambuii 2006). Wambuii views external shocks, such as infectious disease, as
mechanisms for, rather than impediments to, democratization (Wambuii 2006).
This view is similar to Menzel’s (2017) in that it is grounded in the assumption that
an external shock like infectious disease (in Menzel’s case, Ebola, and Wambuii’s
12

case, AIDS) will unite the public with the government against a common adversary,
rather than pushing the government to adopt more authoritarian measures to
suppress the public.
In comparison to Wambuii’s perspective, scholars Robert Mattes and Ryann
Manning (2003) theorize that HIV/AIDS may have a damaging effect on civil society
engagement. They argue that because of the demographic scope of individuals that
generally participate in civil society organizations, these individuals may be more
susceptible to contracting HIV (Mattes & Manning 2003). For instance, many
individuals involved with civil society organizations tend to be younger and travel
far more frequently to do extension work (Mattes & Manning 2003). These effects
have been exacerbated, as many individuals within civil society organizations who
contract HIV have skills that take years to hone (Mattes & Manning 2003). In
addition to these projections regarding civil society, Mattes and Manning also
explore the importance of democratic consolidation in predicting a democracy’s
resilience to endogenous and exogenous shocks. They argue that the increasingly
common turnover in government positions due to HIV/AIDS-related circumstances
prevents effective institutionalization required for democratic consolidation (Mattes
& Manning 2003). This not only decreases the efficiency of political institutions, but
it also makes it difficult to pass the skills necessary to serve in these government
positions on to future generations (Mattes & Manning 2003). This theoretical
argument, however, contradicts Wambuii’s argument that HIV/AIDS serves as a
catalyst for democratization (2006). These contradictory theoretical arguments may
13

be due to the fact that these scholars are intersecting with the pandemic at different
stages of its development.
Though the impact of specific health crises, particularly HIV/AIDS and
Ebola, on political stability has received attention within the discipline, the effect of
disease burdens in general on democracy has been rather superficially explored.
While the works explored here may serve as a guiding post for this research
endeavor, they either approach the question theoretically (Price-Smith 2002; Mattes
& Manning 2003) or only through a specific instance of the phenomena (Dionne
2018; Wambuii 2006). This project seeks to build upon this existing literature to
develop a more comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the influence of disease
burden on civil liberties and civil society.

14

Chapter III: Expected Outcomes
This section explores my hypotheses going into the quantitative and
qualitative analyses of these relationships. The diseases are categorized in this way
because governments are likely to respond differently to diseases developing over
varied time periods; I anticipate that these governments would respond most
distinctly to short-wave crises because of the shock they can pose to political, social,
and economic institutions.

Long-Wave Diseases
Civil Liberties
I anticipate that long-wave diseases will have a negative impact on civil
liberties, particularly the social group bias indicator. Those living with HIV/AIDS
are often stigmatized, and, as a result, I expect this specific indicator to decrease as
the HIV rate increases. I anticipate that an increasing HIV rate will have no effect
on the other civil liberties indicators, including freedom from torture, transparency
and predictability of law enforcement, reverence for law by government officials,
and freedom of movement, mostly because of the way the disease is transmitted.

Civil Society
I anticipate that a long-wave disease like HIV/AIDS will lead to increased
civil society participation. Diseases like HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis are pervasive,
touching the lives of most citizens in one way or another. If political leaders do not
work effectively to address these pervasive issues, they are unlikely to maintain the
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support of the electorate or “selectorate” required for them to remain in office.
Additionally, government leaders are not sheltered from the effects of these
diseases, unlike with some of the other disease types, and, thus, are more likely to
be personally invested in efforts to combat the proliferation of the disease and
prevent further loss of life. For these reasons, government leaders may be more
inclined to engage community actors to find methods to address the disease burden.

Short-Wave Diseases
Civil Liberties
Out of all the civil liberties indicators, I expect that short-wave diseases, like
Ebola and influenza, may have the most significant influence on freedom of
movement. The nature of the short-wave diseases is likely to elicit a different
response from both the government and the populace as compared to long-wave and
endemic diseases. Because of the perceived transmissibility of these diseases, the
government may be inclined to impose lockdown measures. While these lockdowns
may be justified given the nature of the diseases, we should look at the temporal
and sociopolitical context to determine whether political leaders may have had an
ulterior motive in imposing lockdown measures. These motives could include stifling
opposition groups, limiting voting and/or campaigning opportunities during an
election period, and more. Furthermore, I think that an increasing rate of one of
these communicable diseases may create stigmatization around those associated
with the disease, including healthcare workers, current patients, and survivors,
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which would affect the impartial enforcement variables, particularly enjoyment of
civil liberties by specific social groups.

Civil Society
In considering the reviewed literature, I expect that short-wave epidemics
will have a positive impact on the development of civil society. In her article, Menzel
argued that health crises like Ebola provide a common enemy that citizens and
governments must work together to defeat (2017). I predict that this motivation or
“common enemy” outlook may increase citizen participation in and government
consultation of civil society organizations while also reducing civil society
repression.

Endemic Diseases
Civil Liberties
I do not expect endemic diseases like malaria and measles to have a
significant impact on civil liberties. While they can occasionally flare up, endemic
disease rates generally remain constant. Thus, in the short term, I believe they do
not threaten a shock significant enough to the political system that would affect
civil liberties.

Civil Society
I predict that increasing rates or even persistence of endemic diseases will
lead to increased civil society engagement and citizen participation in civil society
organizations. Treatments and preventative methods for endemic diseases like
malaria and measles are available, though they can still be expensive. Due to the
17

availability of these treatments and the prevalence of these diseases in many subSaharan nations, I anticipate that the government will be more likely to consult
with civil society to decrease the disease burden.

18

Chapter IV: Methodology
This project seeks to combine qualitative and quantitative methods to obtain
a comprehensive picture of the interaction between disease burden and democracy.
It draws on two datasets: The Global Burden of Disease (GBD) dataset (Global
Burden of Disease Collaborative Network 2020) and the Varieties of Democracy (VDem) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2020b). The GBD dataset provides a holistic and
quantifiable picture of health loss resulting from hundreds of diseases, injuries, and
risk factors (IHME 2019). GBD uses a variety of measures to assess health loss, but
this study will focus solely on the prevalence of each disease (IHME: 2019). GBD
defines prevalence as “the total number of cases of a given disease in a specified
population at a designated time” (IHME 2021). These measures are quantified
using three metrics: rate, number, and percent (IHME 2019). For the purposes of
this study, I will focus on the prevalence rate of a handful of causes identified by
GBD: HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, Ebola, lower respiratory infections, malaria, and an
aggregate of other infectious diseases (including measles, tetanus, diphtheria,
whooping cough, varicella, encephalitis, and meningitis).
The GBD dataset will be used in conjunction with the V-Dem dataset. The VDem dataset looks at a handful of democratic indices, each measured by specific
indicators (Coppedge et al. 2020b). The data gathered and incorporated into V-Dem
has been coded by a variety of individuals, including research assistants, project
managers, country coordinators, and country experts (Coppedge et al. 2020b). The
ordinal data coded by these experts is aggregated by the measurement model to
19

create an interval measure useful for purposes of analysis (Coppedge et al. 2020b).
For the purposes of this study, I will focus on two measures of democracy: civil
liberties and civil society. Civil liberties are measured by personal integrity rights
(freedom from torture and freedom from political killings), impartial enforcement
(transparent laws with predictable enforcement, rigorous and impartial public
administration, social class equality in regard for civil liberties, social group
equality in regard for civil liberties, stronger civil liberties characteristics, weaker
civil liberties characteristics), and private and political liberties (freedom of
discussion, freedom of academic and cultural expression, freedom of religion,
freedom of foreign movement, and freedom of domestic movement) (Coppedge et al.
2020b). In considering the role of civil society, V-Dem looks at civil society
organizations’ (CSOs) ease of entry and exit, CSO repression, CSO consultation,
CSO participatory environment, CSO structure, religious organization repression,
and religious organization consultation (Coppedge et al. 2020b).
This study utilizes a linear regression to analyze the relationship between
the dependent variables (civil liberties and civil society) and the independent
variable (change in one of the following disease variables – HIV rate, tuberculosis
rate, Ebola rate, lower respiratory infection rate, malaria rate, and other infectious
disease rate), while controlling for the effects of GDP per capita (using logarithmic
transformation), GDP growth, and natural resource rents. I look at a sample of 46
countries from sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2019 for each disease, except
malaria, which looks at only 43 countries during this time period (see appendix A).
20

Additional analyses have been run using the random-effects and fixed effects
models (see appendices B and C). These models control for variation driven by intracountry changes, which is useful for this analysis given the broad range of histories,
cultures, and political structures of states in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the
variables used in the regression indicate the change in the variable over one year
and have been calculated by dividing the rate of the original variable by a version of
the variable with a one-year lag. The table below contains descriptive summaries of
the variables studied.
Table 1: Descriptive Summaries of Variables
Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Range

Interquartile
Range

1449
1449
1449

0.0286409
0.2981586
4.01E-06

0.0403614
0.0676156
0.0020184

0.1980438
0.3624357
0.0018468

0.0293477
0.1003342
0

1445

0.0020184

0.0004432

0.0022097

0.0005958

1449

0.1710046

0.1515945

0.5432985

0.2831307

1449

0.0231253

0.0061298

0.0333034

0.0079365

1479
1479

0.5897106
0.6480527

0.2290039
0.2106809

0.914
0.93

0.362
0.299

1242
1242

7.677614
0.0200145

0.9333673
0.1018818

5.852
1.557

1.02
0.082

1334

11.69926

11.68061

84.22876

12.56929

Independent Variables
HIV Rate
Tuberculosis Rate
Ebola Rate
Lower Respiratory
Infection Rate
Malaria Rate
Other Infectious
Disease Rate

Dependent Variables
Civil Liberties
Civil Society

Control Variables
GDP per capita (ln)
GDP Growth
Total Natural
Resource Rents

In addition to identifying any quantitative relationship between the two
variables, this project seeks to delve deeper into the numerical data by examining a
handful of case studies using a process-tracing method. In process-tracing, I will
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rely on periodicals, news articles, publications by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), government publications, and academic publications to tease out the
mechanisms through which disease burdens influence the aforementioned
democracy indicators, if any such mechanisms exist.
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Chapter V: Long-Wave Diseases
Background
HIV/AIDS
The first cases of HIV/AIDS were diagnosed in the early 1970s in the United
States (Kagaayi & Serwadda 2016). At this time, many believed HIV/AIDS was a
disease that only affected four different groups of people: hemophiliacs,
homosexuals, intravenous drug users, and Haitians, as some early cases had been
discovered in a Haitian community in Miami (Kagaayi & Serwadda 2016). A little
over a decade later, the first clue that HIV cases also existed in Africa was
uncovered in Belgium (Kagaayi & Serwadda 2016). A handful of Congolese
immigrants sought medical assistance from a local hospital and were eventually
diagnosed with the disease (Kagaayi & Serwadda 2016). Cases like these began to
pop up among African populations across Europe, leading medical scientists to
begin investigating the prevalence and transmission of HIV/AIDS across Africa
(Kagaayi & Serwadda 2016). A majority of this research in Africa was conducted in
an effort to prove that the disease originated on the African continent; since
HIV/AIDS was so stigmatized in the West, this research influenced the way in
which some African governments responded to the epidemic, as they did not want
the high prevalence of disease to negatively impact their burgeoning economies,
largely based on tourism (Kagaayi & Serwadda 2016).
This stigmatization, along with existing sociopolitical attitudes in many
African nations, played a role in delaying the response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic,
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with most governments denying such a problem even existed (Kagaayi & Serwadda
2016). Uganda, under President Yoweri Musuveni, was the first African nation to
establish an AIDS Control Program (ACP) in 1986, which was followed by the
Uganda AIDS Commission (UAC) in 1990 (Kagaayi & Serwadda 2016). The ACP
and UAC worked closely with a variety of stakeholders – including politicians,
religious leaders, and other community-based organizations (Kagaayi & Serwadda
2016). Each affected African nation recognized and responded to the epidemic on its
own timeline, largely moved by the incredibly high morbidity and mortality rates
caused by HIV/AIDS in particular regions (Kagaayi & Serwadda 2016). In the early
1990s, over 50% of adult mortality could be attributed to HIV infection; not only
was the adult mortality rate high, but increased HIV prevalence and mortality also
increased the rate of orphanhood and child-headed households in the hardest-struck
communities (Kagaayi & Serwadda 2016).
The introduction of early antiretroviral therapies in 1996, and their
continued development throughout the early 2000s, offered a glimmer of hope to
AIDS patients around the world (Kagaayi & Serwadda 2016). However, because of
their tremendous annual costs, these early medications could not be distributed in
many low- and middle-income countries (Kagaayi & Serwadda 2016). As these
treatments further developed, and funds became available through international
programs such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the number of AIDS
patients receiving treatment increased dramatically, from only 100,000 in 2002 to
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10.7 million in 2014 (Kagaayi & Serwadda 2016). According to the World Health
Organization (WHO), Africa still carries the largest HIV/AIDS burden in the world,
accounting for two-thirds of new HIV infections globally (WHO Regional Office for
Africa 2021a).

Tuberculosis
Even above HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis is the leading cause of death worldwide
from a sole infectious agent according to the WHO (WHO 2020). In 2019 alone, the
disease killed 1.4 million people (WHO 2020). Africa carries 29% of global
tuberculosis cases and 34% of tuberculosis-related deaths (Chaisson & Martinson
2008). Furthermore, autopsies have shown that between 30 and 40% of adults
infected with HIV die from tuberculosis, demonstrating the interconnectedness of
the impact of these two diseases (Chaisson & Martinson 2008). Tuberculosis is
caused by the bacteria Mycobacterium tuberculosis and spreads within the human
population by inhaling air that has been infected with tuberculosis through coughs,
sneezes, or spit from someone infected with the disease (Chatterjee & Pramanik
2015; Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention [Africa CDC] 2021). The
disease infects approximately one third of the world’s population (Chatterjee &
Pramanik 2015). While this infection rate is high, only 5-10% of those infected
develop clinical tuberculosis two years following initial infection (Chatterjee &
Pramanik 2015). In recent years, tuberculosis prevalence has been increasing,
partially due to the rapid proliferation of HIV as well as increased bacterial
resistance to medications within the population (Chatterjee & Pramanik 2015).
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What makes this disease all the more concerning is the emergence of several drugresistant strains of tuberculosis (Chaisson & Martinson 2008). Medications to treat
tuberculosis have been available for decades, but when these treatments are used
incorrectly, drug resistance emerges (WHO 2020). Multi-drug resistant tuberculosis
(MDR-TB) is a form of tuberculosis that is resistant to two of the commonly-used
drugs to treat tuberculosis – isoniazid and rifampicin (WHO 2020). Currently, only
about 57% of patients with MDR-TB are effectively treated (WHO 2020).
Further efforts have been undertaken on both the national and international
level to combat tuberculosis and its multitude of drug-resistant strains. In 2003, the
European Parliament established the European & Developing countries Clinical
Trials Partnership (EDCTP) to support the advancement of local research, training,
and capacity development to effectively lessen the tuberculosis burden (Zumla et al.
2015). African health ministers promised an expeditious response to fight the
disease in 2005, declaring a “TB Emergency” (Chaisson & Martinson 2008).
Currently, the WHO works closely with partners in government and civil society to
enhance the global response to tuberculosis, with the hopes of ending the epidemic
by 2030 (WHO 2020).

Quantitative Analysis
Civil Liberties
The results from the linear regression for the relationship between long-wave
diseases and civil liberties are shown below in Table 2. The regression results show
a positive and highly significant relationship between the change in the HIV rate
26

over one year and a change in civil liberties over one year. Additionally, we can see
a positive and significant relationship between a change in the rate of tuberculosis
over one year and a change in civil liberties over one year. I also ran random and
fixed effects models to control for intra-country variation (see appendices B and C).
The random effects model confirms these results. However, the fixed effects model
finds a significant relationship between the tuberculosis rate from the year prior
and a change in civil liberties for that year, rather than the change in the
tuberculosis rate over one year. These findings do not align with the expected
outcomes laid out in Chapter III and will be further explored through processtracing in a following section.
Table 2: Long-Wave Diseases and Civil Liberties

VARIABLES

Change in Civil Liberties

HIV Rate (1-year lag)

0.027
(0.111)
0.160***
(0.057)
—
—
—
—
-0.014**
(0.006)
0.070
(0.080)
0.000
(0.000)
0.953***
(0.060)

—
—
—
—
0.110
(0.120)
1.208*
(0.661)
-0.013*
(0.007)
0.066
(0.082)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.101
(0.582)

1,173
0.038

1,173
0.022

HIV Rate Change
Tuberculosis Rate (1-year lag)
Tuberculosis Rate Change
GDP per capita (ln)
GDP Growth
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Civil Society
The regression results analyzing the relationship between long-wave diseases
and civil society participation are listed below in Table 3. From the table, we can
identify a positive and significant relationship between a change in the HIV rate
over one year and a change in civil society participation. We can also see a positive
and significant relationship between a change in the rate of tuberculosis over one
year and a change in the rate of civil society participation over one year. The
random and fixed effects models also corroborate these results (see appendices B
and C). These findings align with the expected outcomes from Chapter III,
supporting the qualitative findings of Wambuii’s study of HIV/AIDS and civil
society in Kenya. Further, these results seem to refute the theoretical postulations
laid out by Mattes and Manning in their prediction of a negative relationship
between HIV/AIDS and civil society participation.
Table 3: Long-Wave Diseases and Civil Society Participation

VARIABLES

Change in Civil Society Participation

HIV Rate (1-year lag)

0.111
(0.161)
0.213***
(0.062)
—
—
—
—
-0.020**
(0.009)
0.129
(0.112)
0.000
(0.000)
0.945***
(0.065)

—
—
—
—
-0.077
(0.154)
2.475**
(1.154)
-0.022**
(0.010)
0.131
(0.121)
-0.000
(0.000)
-1.216
(1.030)

1,173

1,173

HIV Rate Change
Tuberculosis Rate (1-year lag)
Tuberculosis Rate Change
GDP per capita (ln)
GDP Growth
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)
Constant
Observations
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R-squared

0.035

0.024

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Case Study: HIV/AIDS Response in Tanzania
Since Tanzania reported its first three cases of HIV/AIDS in 1983, the
disease has spread to both urban and rural areas of the country (Ndimbwa,
Emanuel, & Mushi 2013). The Tanzanian government initiated its first
institutionalized response to the disease in 1985 with its National AIDS Control
Program (Ndimbwa, Emanuel, & Mushi 2013). In December 2000, then-President
Benjamin William Mkapa announced the creation of the Tanzania Commission for
AIDS (TACAIDS) (TACAIDS 2021). According to a 2017-2018 TACAIDS report, the
annual number of new HIV infections occurring in the country has declined by half
since the first cases of AIDS reported in 1983 (TACAIDS 2018).
In the 2017 TACAIDS report, the commission identifies “key and vulnerable
populations” in which the epidemic is concentrated, namely men who have sex with
men (MSM), people who inject drugs (PWID), sex workers, and clients of sex
workers (TACAIDS 2018). However, early on in the report, the commission
identifies that the social groups constituting the largest percent of HIV
transmission are heterosexual couples in stable relationships (38.8%) and
heterosexual couples who engage in casual sex (28.9%) (TACAIDS 2018: 1). The key
and vulnerable populations emphasized early on in the report only accounted for
15.5% of transmissions, with all data coming from the Modes of HIV Transmission
study from 2014 (TACAIDS 2018). This discrepancy could be due to a lack of data
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caused by the stigma and discrimination encountered by being part of one of the
aforementioned vulnerable social groups in Tanzania (TACAIDS 2018).
Several human rights groups have reported violations of civil liberties within
these groups, including the 2016 ban on HIV/AIDS outreach and services to MSM
by the Magufuli administration (Allinder 2018). In Tanzania, sodomy is illegal and
holds a 30-year prison sentence, making MSM reluctant to pursue health services
and treatment for HIV (Allinder 2018). Additionally, according to Human Rights
Watch, the Tanzanian government banned health and rights organizations serving
LGBT communities, including CHESA, Kazi Busara na Hekima, and AHA
Development Organisation in Tanzania, for violating “Tanzanian law, ethics, and
culture” (Human Rights Watch 2020). These policies specifically impact the
indicator measuring social group equality in respect for civil liberties, which is
aggregated into the civil liberties indicator used in this study.
Figure one (below) identifies how respect for civil liberties in Tanzania has
changed between 1990 and 2019, demonstrating a distinct downward trend in
recent years. (Civil liberties is measured on a scale of 0-1, with 0 representing no
respect for civil liberties and 1 representing the utmost respect for civil liberties
[Coppedge 2020b]). While at first this may seem to contradict the findings from the
regression, it may actually support them. Figure two shows the change in the HIV
rate between 1990 and 2019, illustrating a declining HIV prevalence rate from 1997
onward. This case study thus illustrates that a decrease in the HIV rate may
correlate with a decrease in respect for civil liberties, which would still appear as a
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positive coefficient in the regression. This study mainly considers how increases in
disease prevalence rates may influence civil liberties and civil society, rather than
how a decrease in disease prevalence might influence these variables, a question
this case study brings to light. It is important to keep in mind that these results
demonstrate a correlation between these two variables – not a causal relationship –
and that the mechanisms through which this converse relationship operates require
further qualitative investigation.

Figure 1: Civil Liberties in Tanzania 1990-2019
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Figure 2: HIV Rate in Tanzania 1990-2019

Tanzania saw increased growth in civil society participation in the 1990’s,
when HIV/AIDS was beginning to be recognized as both a social and medical
problem (Ndimbwa, Emanuel, & Mushi 2013). Though the Tanzanian government
has made significant efforts to slow the spread of the disease, its initial approach
was relatively inefficient (Ndimbwa, Emanuel, & Mushi 2013). The government is
bureaucratic in nature and tends to focus on process, whereas civil society
organizations are more democratic in nature and focus on outcomes (Ndimbwa,
Emanuel, & Mushi 2013). Therefore, civil society organizations have largely risen to
the task of providing support for those living with HIV as well as educational
programs to spread information about the disease (Ndimbwa, Emanuel, & Mushi
2013). According to the PEPFAR Tanzania Country Operational Plan published in
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2020, these civil society organizations have continued to expand their role and hold
a prominent position in reaching target populations and reducing the stigma
surrounding HIV (PEPFAR 2020b).
The Tanzanian National Policy on HIV/AIDS report published in 2001
demonstrates that, early on in the pandemic, the Tanzanian government recognized
the imperative role played by community-based organizations in providing support
to individuals, families, and communities affected by HIV/AIDS, including the
provision of home-based care and financial support for patients and their families
(The United Republic of Tanzania Prime Minister’s Office 2001). Two of the most
prominent civil society organizations in Tanzania, WAMATA and PASADA,
developed in response to the HIV/AIDS crisis in order to provide those living with
HIV and their loved ones with social support, particularly counseling, care, and
community-building programs (Ndimbwa, Emanuel, & Mushi 2013). In a survey, a
sample of 47 individuals living with HIV/AIDS identified the main services provided
by PASADA and WAMATA (Ndimbwa, Emanuel, & Mushi 2013). PASADA
provided services such as spiritual counseling, orphan support, social assistance,
voluntary counseling and testing, home-based care, community education, and
support for elders (Ndimbwa, Emanuel, & Mushi 2013). WAMATA provided
services, including counseling, training, spreading awareness, supporting orphans,
providing material support, HIV education, and prevention of mother-to-child
transmission (Ndimbwa, Emanuel, & Mushi 2013). Furthermore, members of
WAMATA contribute funds and food for AIDS-affected families in dire need as well
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as supporting these families with home repairs and delivery of medical supplies
(Mutangadura, Mukurazita, & Jackson 1999). Both NGOs provided free medical
care to individuals living with HIV and worked to reduce the stigma surrounding
the disease within their communities (Ndimbwa, Emanuel, & Mushi 2013).
Additionally, according to a report from UNAIDS, indigenous organizations
played an essential part in providing financial support to those affected by
HIV/AIDS early on in the pandemic (Mutangadura, Mukurazita, & Jackson 1999).
In the Kagera region of Tanzania, as well as in communities in Zimbabwe and
Zambia, indigenous savings clubs, such as rotating savings and credit associations
(ROSCAs) and conventional savings clubs, assisted households in coping with the
impact of HIV/AIDS (Mutangadura, Mukurazita, & Jackson 1999). ROSCAs have
been an important aspect of community life in many African countries for a long
time (Mutangadura, Mukurazita, & Jackson 1999). A ROSCA refers to a group of
individuals who have agreed to contribute to a savings fund given in turn either
partially or in whole to each of the contributors, where each member contributes the
same amount (Mutangadura, Mukurazita, & Jackson 1999). These ROSCAs were
essential to community-based HIV/AIDS responses, as they provide insurance that
can be drawn on in an emergency, giving each member access to an amount of
money larger than they could have accumulated on their own (Mutangadura,
Mukurazita, & Jackson 1999).
However, a more recent study found that HIV/AIDS has actually impacted
households’ abilities to participate in ROSCAs, as they may withhold funds that
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could be used to address individual household crises (Foster 2007). More recent
studies have shown that philanthropic groups have been effective in supporting HIV
affected individuals in families financially (Foster 2007). In mutual assistance
groups, Tanzanian villagers contribute money or participate in labor-sharing during
times of need, including sickness and death, within their communities (Foster
2007). Women in particular played a large role in assisting families affected by
AIDS (Foster 2007). This study also amply demonstrates the role that communitybased organizations have played in responding to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in
Tanzania. Both the UNAIDS study and that of Ndimbwa, Emanuel, and Mushi
illustrate the positive, significant relationship between a change in the prevalence
rate of HIV/AIDS and a change in civil society participation established by the
quantitative results.
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Chapter VI: Short-Wave Diseases
Background
Ebola
The Ebola virus disease (EVD), colloquially known as Ebola, first emerged in
1976 in areas of what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)
and Sudan (Baseler et al. 2017). Early on, scientists assumed that both outbreaks
were one single event, where a traveler had brought the virus from one location to
another (Baseler et al. 2017). Upon further investigation, scientists found that the
epidemics were caused by two ebolaviruses which were genetically distinct yet
phylogenetically related (Baseler et al. 2017). EVD, like yellow fever and dengue
fever, is a viral hemorrhagic fever (Baseler et al. 2017). Within the human
population, EVD spreads through direct contact with bodily fluids of an infected
person (e.g., blood, secretions, organs, etc.) or with contaminated surfaces and
materials (e.g., clothes, bedding, etc.) (WHO 2021a).
From 2013 to 2016, West Africa faced what is considered to be the most
severe Ebola outbreak since the disease was first observed (Gillespie et al. 2016).
Initially, local governments and the international community underestimated the
scope of the outbreak, leading to a slow start in Ebola response initiatives (Gillespie
et al. 2016). This initial response focused on containing the spread of the virus and
establishing effective mechanisms for surveillance, logistics for treatment, and
burials for those who lost loved ones (Gillespie et al. 2016). However, because this
primary response did not work within community structures or community coping
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mechanisms, the response led to further misinformation and misconceptions, as the
community did not trust the messaging from formal sources (Gillespie et al. 2016).
As case numbers continued to increase, officials observed the shortcomings of the
initial response and focused on increasing community engagement and social
mobilization during the second approach to containing the outbreak (Gillespie et al.
2016). Eventually, this second response provided a clear role for community-based
solutions in spreading veracious information about the outbreak. By the time the
outbreak was declared over, the virus had killed 11,310 people and left 23,588
children without one or both parents (Gillespie et al. 2016).
The second largest Ebola outbreak, and the first to occur in a conflict region,
occurred in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in
2018 (Congressional Research Service 2020). This outbreak ultimately killed almost
2,300 individuals in a region with few recent outbreaks (Congressional Research
Service 2020). The fact that this outbreak occurred in a conflict zone further
complicated efforts to contain the virus (Congressional Research Service 2020). The
framework for responding to an Ebola outbreak requires infection prevention within
health facilities, isolation of patients, rapid diagnosis using fever surveillance,
contact-tracing, and community awareness (Congressional Research Service 2020).
Due to a lack of accessibility and insecurity in the region, these approaches had to
be modified in order to contain the outbreak and ensure the safety of healthcare
personnel (Congressional Research Service 2020). In terms of community response,
a focus group study exploring social resistance during the eastern DRC outbreak
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revealed eyewitness narratives of aggressive resistance to efforts to contain the
virus, including what were perceived as inadequate response efforts, mistrust of the
motives of government and other actors, and disrespect for cultural burial traditions
(Claude, Underschultz, & Hawkes 2019). The study concludes that this social
resistance could be due to deeply seated political and historical mistrust (Claude,
Underschultz, & Hawkes 2019).
Since the West Africa outbreak (2013-2016), there have been six additional
outbreaks of Ebola, all but one of which have occurred in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo; the other, most recent outbreak is currently ongoing in Guinea (2021)
(WHO 2021a).

Lower Respiratory Infections
Lower respiratory infections include pneumonia, bronchiolitis, respiratory
syncytial virus, and influenza-like diseases (IHME 2021). The nature of influenza
viruses is more likely to cause shocks to social and political systems and, thus, will
be the focus of this study. According to the WHO, influenza viruses come in one of
four types: A, B, C, and D (WHO 2018a). Viruses of the Type A variety can infect
both animals and humans; most influenza pandemics can be attributed to the
emergence of novel, diverse influenza A strains that can infect humans with
sustained human-to-human transmission (WHO 2018a). B-type influenza is
responsible for seasonal influenza epidemics (WHO 2018a). Influenza type C can
infect humans, but infections tend to be minor and are not often reported (WHO
2018a). Lastly, influenza D is not known to infect humans (WHO 2018a).
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Since most influenza pandemics are caused by influenza A types, we will
focus on the subtypes of influenza A (WHO 2018a). Influenza A viruses can be
classified based on the animal that originally hosted the virus – avian influenza,
swine influenza, or other animal-based influenza viruses (WHO 2018a). These
different influenza infections can manifest themselves differently in humans –
causing anything from a mild upper respiratory infection to severe pneumonia or
acute respiratory distress syndrome (WHO 2018a). Out of the two named influenza
A types (avian and swine), the avian influenza tends to be more aggressive (WHO
2018a).
Since the year 1580, there have been 31 suspected outbreaks of influenza
(Sambala et al. 2018). After experiencing devastating losses due to pandemic
influenza in 1957 and 1968 (two to three million deaths in Africa alone) and in
anticipation of a future pandemic, the WHO asked member states to develop a
pandemic preparedness plan so that, if and when the time came, each nation state
could effectively respond to and mitigate the health crisis (Sambala et al. 2018). In a
study by Evanson Sambala and his colleagues in 2018, the quality of these plans
was evaluated for nations in the WHO African region (Sambala et al. 2018). Of the
35 countries surveyed, 24 plans engaged local people and medical personnel, 22
nations had a communication strategy for spreading information about the
outbreak, 26 countries had plans for non-pharmaceutical interventions, like
isolation, shutting down schools, or using personal protective equipment, and 17
plans neglected surveillance and reporting methods for accurate data collection
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(considered to be one of the most essential aspects of pandemic response) (Sambala
et al. 2018). The study found that 74% of the surveyed plans were inadequate in
terms of efficacy in mitigating a potential pandemic (Sambala et al. 2018). These
plans have important ramifications not only in the sphere of healthcare provision
but also in mitigation of the shock a short-wave crisis can pose to an established
social and political system, as demonstrated by the outbreak of COVID-19.

Quantitative Analysis
Civil Liberties
The results of the regression analyzing the relationship between short-wave
diseases and civil liberties are listed below in Table 4. We can identify a significant,
negative relationship between the Ebola rate with a one-year lag and a change in
civil liberties over one year. Because the Ebola rate for many nations in subSaharan Africa is generally zero, the change in Ebola rate could not be calculated.
Furthermore, Ebola is highly specific to two particular regions, Western and
Central Africa. Thus, when using the random and fixed effects models to control for
intra-country variation, the models do not identify a significant relationship
between Ebola and a change in civil liberties. The linear regression identifies a
positive and highly significant relationship between the lower respiratory infection
rate (one-year lag) and a change in civil liberties. These findings are supported by
both the random and fixed effects models (see appendices B and C) and seem to
oppose the predictions in Chapter III. In a following section, I will use qualitative
methods to explore the variation in results for the Ebola models.
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Table 4: Short-Wave Diseases and Civil Liberties

VARIABLES

Change in Civil Liberties

Ebola Rate (1-year lag)

-17.195**
(7.769)
—
—
—
—
-0.011**
(0.005)
0.043
(0.084)
0.000
(0.000)
1.107***
(0.040)

—
—
47.998***
(14.071)
0.615*
(0.328)
-0.003
(0.005)
0.066
(0.081)
0.000
(0.000)
0.339
(0.328)

1,173
0.006

1,169
0.029

Lower Respiratory Infection Rate (1-year lag)
Lower Respiratory Infection Rate Change
GDP per capita (ln)
GDP Growth
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Civil Society
The table below (Table 5) contains the results for the regression analyzing
the relationship between short-wave diseases and civil society participation.
Contrary to what was predicted in the expected outcomes section, there is a
significant, negative relationship between the Ebola rate (with a one-year lag) and a
change in civil society participation over one year. Again, because of the regional
specificity of the disease, the change in Ebola rate over one year could not be
calculated. Similar to the results from the prior civil liberties analysis, the random
and fixed effects models did not identify a significant relationship between the
Ebola rate and a change in civil society participation. The linear regression also
identifies a positive and highly significant relationship between the lower
respiratory infection rate (one-year lag) and a change in civil society participation.
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These findings are confirmed by both the random and fixed effects models (see
appendices B and C). The results for lower respiratory infections align with the
predictions laid out in Chapter III. However, the discrepancy in the Ebola outcomes
warrant further exploration through qualitative work.
Table 5: Short-Wave Diseases and Civil Society Participation

VARIABLES

Change in Civil Society Participation

Ebola Rate (1-year lag)

-23.135***
(7.432)
—
—
—
—
-0.016**
(0.006)
0.093
(0.111)
-0.000
(0.000)
1.148***
(0.052)

—
—
53.832***
(17.708)
0.691
(0.449)
-0.007
(0.007)
0.119
(0.115)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.285
(0.433)

1,173
0.006

1,169
0.021

Lower Respiratory Infection Rate (1-year lag)
Lower Respiratory Infection Rate Change
GDP per capita (ln)
GDP Growth
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Case Study: Liberia’s Response to Ebola
The first Ebola epidemic in West Africa mainly affected three nations –
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Nyenswah et al. 2014). Guinea’s Ministry of
Health first reported the outbreak on March 21, 2014, citing symptoms such as
fever, diarrhea, and vomiting as well as a high fatality rate (Nyenswah et al. 2014).
Nine months later, Liberia had documented the largest number of deaths and cases
from the disease, with 6,525 cases and 2,697 deaths (Nyenswah et al. 2014). Not
only was Liberia fighting this tremendous epidemic, but the country was also
42

recovering from the effects of a relatively recent civil war, beginning in 1999 and
ending in 2003 (Onishi 2014). The relative newness of the administration, among
other factors, fostered distrust between the people and the government, even
causing suspicion that the government had fabricated the Ebola crisis in order to
receive increased foreign aid (Onishi 2014). The following section seeks to
understand how these factors interacted to produce the Liberian government’s
response to the Ebola epidemic, particularly in terms of this response’s effects on
civil liberties and civil society.
Early on in the crisis, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf declared a
state of emergency, imposing a lockdown on the country for a period of 90 days
(BBC 2014). According to reports from the BBC, President Sirleaf declared that
“some civil liberties might have to be suspended” to contain the outbreak (BBC
2014). Furthermore, she stated that Liberia needed “extraordinary measures for the
very survival of our state and for the protection of the lives of our people” (BBC
2014). These measures included restrictions on freedom of domestic movement,
particularly a military blockade barring individuals from travelling from Ebolaheavy regions in western Liberia into the capital, Monrovia (BBC 2014). Because of
the sudden onset of the disease and the swift imposition of lockdown measures,
people were not given sufficient time to prepare, leading to shortages in food staples
(BBC 2014). Additionally, there were many preexisting, inherent problems with the
Liberian health system, including a lack of health care facilities, equipment, and
personnel, which were sharply illuminated during the crisis (BBC 2014).
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Two to three weeks after the government imposed the lockdown, there were
clashes between police officers and protestors of the lockdown measures in
Monrovia (Onishi 2014). The police officers and soldiers, armed with riot gear,
barricaded the roads; the coast guard also barred Monrovians from leaving the area
via canoes (Onishi 2014). In an attempt to get through the barricades and escape
the quarantined area, protesters threw rocks and charged the police officers and
soldiers barricading the road (Onishi 2014). The soldiers responded by firing live
rounds at the crowd, though the army’s brigade commander Colonel Prince Johnson
claimed that the soldiers had only fired into the air, driving the protestors away
(Onishi 2014).
The measures taken by the Liberian government can clearly be tied back to
the theory of securitization expounded by Elbe (2006) and Andrew Price-Smith
(2002), as Ebola is painted as a threat to the very existence of the state itself, rather
than a political or policy issue. In fact, a state of emergency as defined by the
Liberian Constitution requires “civil unrest affecting the existence, security and
well-being of the Republic amounting to a clear and present danger,” meaning that
the securitization of disease was necessary to satisfy the “clear and present danger”
requirement fundamental to the existence of a state of emergency (Al-bakri Nyei
2016). These events clearly illustrate and support the negative relationship between
the Ebola rate and the change in civil liberties identified by the quantitative
results. We should also note, however, that these events did not occur in a vacuum;
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the international hysteria surrounding the disease likely played a role in the
Liberian response – both of the government and the populace – to the crisis.
The lockdown also had ramifications for civil society organizations within
Liberia (Al-bakri Nyei 2016). The state of emergency, and the restrictions on
fundamental freedoms it entailed, which President Sirleaf had declared in early
August expired in October, and, when she attempted to renew to measures to
continue to mitigate the spread of Ebola, the legislature rejected the proposal (Albakri Nyei 2016). Many Liberians felt that these restrictions on civil liberties were
an attempt to silence the opposition and suppress civil society (Al-bakri Nyei 2016).
In the years leading up to the Ebola crisis, Liberia invested heavily in military
development, as the country was rebuilding itself after the end of the 1999-2003
civil war (Al-bakri Nyei 2016). While military development may have been
necessary, the post-war development seemed to have neglected social
infrastructure, such as healthcare and education (Al-bakri Nyei 2016). Rather than
looking to civil society for support in mitigating the crisis, the Liberian government,
as well as international actors such as the United States, France, and the UK,
employed the military in response to Ebola (Al-bakri Nyei 2016). Both national and
international responses to Ebola therefore heightened tensions between the
Liberian government and civil society actors as well as opposition groups,
negatively impacting Liberia’s security and stability (Al-bakri Nyei 2016). These
actions seem to be reflected in the regression results from the previous section,

45

demonstrating a negative relationship between the prevalence of Ebola and civil
society participation.
While the Liberian government may not have looked to civil society for
support, both community-based and faith-based organizations played a critical role
in the behavior changes essential to preventing the spread of the virus. In her study
of the West African Ebola outbreak, Gillepsie recognizes that “… the formal
response at that time paid little attention to working within community structures
and did not acknowledge traditional community coping strategies and influences on
behavior” (Gillespie et al. 2016: 627). Community-based responses initiated by nongovernmental organizations were key to social mobilization in harmonizing respect
for traditional funerary practices with health and safety guidelines, allowing for
safe, yet dignified burials for loved ones (Park 2020). The role of civil society in
facilitating this change signals an increase in civil society participation, contrary to
the results of the quantitative analysis.
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Chapter VII: Endemic Diseases
Background
Malaria
Malaria is a parasitic disease transmitted through the bites of infected
female Anopheles mosquitos (WHO 2021b). Of the five different parasite species
that can cause malaria in humans, two pose the largest threat – P. falciparum and

P. vivax (WHO 2021b). Based on data from 2018, P. falciparum is the leading cause
of malaria in the WHO African Region, responsible for 99.7% of malaria cases
(WHO 2021b). Furthermore, the WHO African Region accounts for 94% of the global
malaria burden (WHO 2021b).
With such a tremendous disease burden, international efforts aimed at
eradicating malaria have been profuse. In 1998, the WHO launched Roll Back
Malaria (RBM), which aims to strengthen health systems and reduce the disease
burden caused by malaria through providing people from all socioeconomic levels
access to antimalaria interventions (Sambo et al. 2011). The Global Malaria Action
Plan was developed in 2008, providing a strategy to increase cost-effective
interventions against malaria (Sambo et al. 2011). In 2009, the African Leaders
Malaria Alliance was established as a part of the 64th Session of the United Nations
General Assembly (Sambo et al. 2011). This alliance seeks to provide a forum for
African leaders to share tools and practices for effective malaria control and to
make sure that malaria is a high priority on the global agenda (Sambo et al. 2011).
Not only have malaria responses been established through international
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organizations, but a myriad of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also
become involved in the international response to malaria. By far, the largest of
these NGO responses has been the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, which
contributes a little less than 5% of the $4.3 billion annually invested to fight
malaria (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 2021). Organizations like the Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation, the President’s Malaria Initiative, the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and the aforementioned international
organizations, seek to mitigate or even eliminate the disease burden caused by
malaria, as, with advancements in modern medicine, the disease is both
preventable and treatable (WHO 2021b; Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 2021).

Other Infectious Diseases
This study utilizes an aggregate of other infectious diseases to study the
relationship between endemic diseases and the two democratic variables. This
aggregate includes measles, tetanus, diphtheria, whooping cough, varicella,
encephalitis, and meningitis. On their own, any one of these diseases may not have
a tremendous influence on the practice of democracy. However, if one considers
their cumulative effects, there may be more tangible or identifiable outcomes to
study.
Measles is an extremely contagious, viral illness caused by Morbillivirus
(WHO Regional Office for Africa 2021b). The disease spreads quickly among the
unvaccinated population, transmitted by droplets emitted from the nose, mouth, or
throat of someone who has been infected with the disease (WHO Regional Office for
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Africa 2021b). Despite the existence of an effective vaccine, measles is still a leading
cause of death among children around the world (WHO Regional Office for Africa
2021b). Like malaria, the international community seems to have mobilized to
mitigate or eradicate measles. Established in 2001, the Measles and Rubella
Initiative seeks to end child deaths caused by measles and to ensure that children
are no longer born with congenital rubella syndrome (WHO Regional Office for
Africa 2021b).
Tetanus is contracted when the bacterium Clostridium Tetani infects a
wound (WHO Regional Office for Africa 2021c). Tetanus infections can be prevented
through vaccines containing tetanus-toxoid (WHO Regional Office for Africa 2021c).
More worrisome, and mostly fatal, are neonatal tetanus infections, which generally
occur in more rural areas where babies are delivered in a non-sterile environment
(WHO Regional Office for Africa 2021c). The United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) has partnered with WHO and the United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA) in the Maternal and Neonatal Tetanus Initiative to revitalize the pursuit
of MNT elimination (WHO Regional Office for Africa 2021c).
Caused by the bacterium Corynebacterium diphtheria, diphtheria infects the
throat and upper airways, secreting a toxin that can impact other organs (WHO
2018b). Infected individuals mainly transmit the disease through sneezes and
coughs that leave droplets in the air, thereby infecting those that breathe in the
infected air (WHO 2018b). Diphtheria also has a vaccine available, which has
dramatically reduced the disease’s mortality and morbidity rates (WHO 2018b).
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However, in low-income and developing countries, this vaccine is less easily
distributed. Though diphtheria is endemic in some places, we have not seen the
same kind of international mobilization against diphtheria as we have for malaria
and measles, likely because its death toll is lower than that of these other diseases.
Whooping cough, also known as pertussis, is caused by the Bordetella

pertussis bacterium (WHO 2021c). This disease is also spread through air infected
with droplets produced by coughs and sneezes (WHO 2021c). Often times,
individuals who contract pertussis go on to develop pneumonia (WHO 2021c). Like
measles, tetanus, and diphtheria, there is also a vaccination for pertussis (WHO
2021c).
Varicella zoster virus (VZV), also known as the chickenpox, is an acute,
extremely contagious illness that generally occurs before an individual reaches ten
years of age (WHO 2021d). This disease is transmitted through aerosol, droplets,
direct contact, or indirect contact through contaminated items (WHO 2021d).
The final two endemic diseases aggregated in the “other infectious disease
rate” are encephalitis and meningitis, both affecting the brain. Meningitis refers to
inflammation of the meninges, which are membranes surrounding the brain and
spinal cord, whereas encephalitis refers to the inflammation of the brain itself
(National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke [NINDS] 2020). Some
forms of meningitis and encephalitis can be spread by exposure to saliva or other
bodily fluids (generally through kissing, coughing, or sharing eating utensils)
(NINDS 2020).
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There is large variation among the infectious diseases studied here, each of
them considered endemic. Some of these diseases, like measles and tetanus, are
surrounded by extensive international mobilization, as they are rarely seen in the
developed world. However, others like varicella, meningitis, and encephalitis are
not geographically specific and affect both high- and low-income countries.

Qualitative Analysis
Civil Liberties
The table below (Table 6) exhibits the results from the regression analyzing
the relationship between endemic diseases and civil liberties. The linear regression
does not identify any significant relationships between either malaria or the other
infectious disease aggregate and civil liberties. The random effects model supports
these results, seeming to corroborate the outcomes predicted in Chapter III.
However, in running the fixed effects models (see appendix C), I found significant
and positive relationships between both the malaria rate (one-year lag) and change
in civil liberties as well as the other infectious disease aggregate rate (one-year lag)
and change in civil liberties.
Table 6: Endemic Diseases and Civil Liberties

VARIABLES

Change in Civil Liberties

Malaria Rate (1-year lag)

0.021

—

(0.032)

—

0.001

—

(0.020)

—

—

0.914

—

(1.100)

—

0.466

Malaria Rate Change
Other Infectious Disease Rate (1-year lag)
Other Infectious Disease Rate Change
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—
-0.010
(0.007)
0.044
(0.088)

(0.334)
-0.006
(0.006)
0.051
(0.082)

Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)

-0.000

-0.000

Constant

(0.000)
1.095***
(0.053)

(0.000)
0.588*
(0.319)

Observations
R-squared

1,095
0.005

1,173
0.008

GDP per capita (ln)
GDP Growth

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Civil Society
Table 7 below displays the results of the linear regression assessing the
relationship between endemic diseases and civil society participation. The
regression does not indicate any significant relationship between malaria and civil
society participation. However, there seems to be a slightly significant, positive
relationship between the other infectious disease aggregate rate (one-year lag) and
a change in civil society participation. These findings are confirmed by the fixed
effects model (see appendix C) but are not supported by the random effects model
(see appendix B). The results from the regression and fixed effects model seem to
partially support the expected outcomes laid out in Chapter III and will be further
explored through qualitative work in the following section.
Table 7: Endemic Diseases and Civil Society Participation

VARIABLES

Change in Civil Society Participation

Malaria Rate (1-year lag)

0.005
(0.035)
0.002
(0.015)

Malaria Rate Change
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—
—
—
—

Other Infectious Disease Rate (1-year lag)
Other Infectious Disease Rate Change
GDP per capita (ln)
GDP Growth
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

—
—
—
—
-0.018**
(0.008)
0.092
(0.116)
-0.000
(0.000)
1.162***
(0.064)

0.920
(1.113)
0.912*
(0.506)
-0.010
(0.007)
0.108
(0.114)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.180
(0.482)

1,095
0.007

1,173
0.009

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Case Study: Measles Outbreak in Madagascar
Madagascar’s national reference laboratory declared an official measles
outbreak on October 4, 2018, starting in the capital city of Antananarivo and
spreading to the other 22 regions in Madagascar (Sodjinou et al. 2020). As of April
2019, only 58% of individuals from the main island had received a measles vaccine
(Bezain 2019). To prevent an outbreak of measles, vaccination rates need to reach
90-95% due to the highly infectious nature of the disease (Bezain 2019). Between
September 2018 and May 2019, Madagascar saw 146,277 reported cases of measles
(Sodjinou et al. 2020). The WHO initiated a reinvigorated vaccination campaign
after the outbreak, but, according to WHO epidemiologist Dr. Vincent Dossou
Sodjinou, these immunization campaigns are not enough – communities are still in
need of care, effective case surveillance, and social mobilization (Bezain 2019).
While there is definitely a place for civil society in response to a crisis like a
measles outbreak, the roles civil society organizations are permitted to take on in
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response to a crisis are limited by the Malagasy government (Makoni 2019).
According to an anonymous NGO representative, criticizing the government’s
response to the outbreak could pose a threat to an NGOs existence, as NGO
registration could be terminated and international civil society activists, including
missionaries, could have their visas revoked (Makoni 2019). Additionally, according
to Munyaradzi Makoni’s report for The Lancet, corruption is a huge barrier to
effective social services (Makoni 2019). Thus, making more space for civil society
would be essential for effective response to health security issues, such as the 20182019 measles outbreak.
While civil society organizations may be limited in their ability to criticize
government preparedness and responsiveness to the crisis, they still played a
significant role in overcoming the deadly 2018 measles outbreak (WHO 2019).
Community mobilization played a large part in Madagascar’s public health response
to the outbreak (WHO 2019). The Ministry of Public Health worked closely with
UNICEF and USAID, alongside local partners, to spread veracious information
about the disease as well as mobilize the measles vaccination campaign (WHO
2019). The measles outbreak in Madagascar seems to have had mixed effects within
civil society. On the one hand, there are reports of civil society repression with the
silencing of government criticism (Makoni 2019). However, it seems that the
Madagascar Ministry of Health did look to civil society for assistance in information
and vaccination campaigns during the outbreak. The latter could explain the
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positive relationship reported by the quantitative results, but the reports of civil
society repression clearly contradict these results.
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Chapter VIII: Discussion & Key Comparisons
The variation both among and within each type of disease in terms of their
impacts on civil liberties and civil society elicits an interesting line of discussion. As
demonstrated by the regression results, there was a positive and significant
relationship between both long-wave diseases (HIV and tuberculosis) and both
democracy variables (civil liberties and civil society). These are the most consistent
results drawn from the regressions, as they are both supported by the fixed and
random effects models and reveal a similar relationship between both long-wave
diseases and the democracy variables. Moreover, these results are supported by the
qualitative case study in Kenya, carried out by Wambuii, which clearly
demonstrates that the HIV/AIDS pandemic has been a catalyst for, rather than an
impediment to, civil society development.
In contrast, the results for both the short-wave and endemic diseases vary
within each category. For example, the significant negative relationship identified
between Ebola and both civil society and civil liberties is precisely the opposite of
the findings for lower respiratory infections, which identify a positive and
significant relationship with both civil liberties and civil society. We also obtain
inconsistent results from the analysis of endemic diseases in their relation to civil
society. Both malaria and the infectious disease aggregate demonstrate no
significant relationship with civil liberties. However, the infectious disease
aggregate demonstrates a positive and significant relationship with civil society,
whereas malaria does not have any significant relationship.
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This variation in results within two of the three categories can be explained
in a few ways. In terms of the short-wave diseases, the urgency to respond to each
kind of crisis was likely quite different. A study conducted by James Shultz and his
colleagues (2016) studied fear-related behaviors in the context of the West African
Ebola outbreak. A few of the fear-arousing elements of the Ebola outbreak are
relevant to this discussion – including fear-arousing symptoms of the disease, feararousing healthcare environment, and fear-arousing government response (Shultz
et al. 2016). The symptoms of disease most likely to instill fear in the populace were
Ebola’s hemorrhagic manifestations; however, the silent and seemingly indetectable
spread of the virus from person to person could also be responsible for sparking a
fear-based response (Shultz et al. 2016). Furthermore, during the West African
outbreak, many communities distrusted healthcare workers and facilities, as
illustrated by the storming and raiding of the primary school converted to Ebola
clinic in the West Point community in Monrovia (Onishi 2014). Finally, the
lockdown imposed by the government sparked fear in the population, particularly
due to the effect it had on the economy. This lockdown led to an increase in prices of
necessary goods and inhibited people from going to work (Onishi 2014). This aligns
with the securitization of disease, or the framing of a health crisis as a threat to
national security, illustrated in the Elbe and Price-Smith analysis in the literature
review. Thus, the securitization of the Ebola outbreak could have been a key factor
in evoking a fear-based response within the populace. The securitization of Ebola
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itself could be deemed a fear-based response on the part of the government and its
leaders.
Conversely, lower respiratory infections are arguably less likely to cause this
heightened panic and elicit a securitization response. The symptoms for more highly
communicable respiratory infections are generally the same as those for seasonal
influenza. This familiarity would likely lead to a less panicked response on the part
of both the populace and the government. Thus, the fear-arousing aspect of Ebola
may have been a key factor in producing the quantitatively identified differences in
the effects of Ebola and lower respiratory infections on civil liberties and civil
society.
In terms of the differences in results between malaria and the infectious
disease aggregate, the reasons behind this variation are less clear. The most
fundamental difference between the two categories is their mode of transmission.
Malaria is transmitted through the bites of female mosquitoes, whereas infectious
diseases require person-to-person transmission. Thus, the infectious diseases may
take on more qualities of a short-wave disease when prevalence spikes in the
population. In contrast, malaria is more of a chronic problem in particular areas
and cannot be spread through person-to-person contact. These differences likely
elicit different responses from the government.
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Chapter IX: Conclusion
The influence of health on governance has often been overlooked in the
discipline of political science, despite the vast amount of data available to study
these intersections. This study seeks to contribute a novel perspective on the
intersection of health and governance and provide a direction for future research on
this health-governance relationship.

Scope & Limitations
Due to the limited scope of this particular study, further research is required
to understand how disease burden may influence other aspects of democracy, such
as different branches of government, elections, media integrity, political equality,
and much more. Limitations in the data also impose a significant difficulty. The
data used did not include local-level analyses, which would have been helpful,
particularly for the endemic diseases and less widespread Ebola epidemics.
Additionally, data on prevalence rates tends to be overestimated, largely because it
may be extrapolated from smaller, antenatal and maternity clinic data. While this
data has become more reliable in recent years (2000-2010), data from the earlier
years of the pandemic may have been impacted.
In terms of control variables, this study did not control for the effects of
existing diseases and health crises. These diseases do not exist independently of one
another. For example, civil liberties and civil society may already be influenced by
an existing disease burden (e.g., HIV) when another health crisis strikes (e.g.,
measles). Thus, isolating these variables for analysis may have impacted the
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results. Additionally, future studies would benefit from using foreign assistance as a
control variable, as aid programs may have had an impact on the democratic
variables studied. Finally, more case studies and qualitative analysis could be used
to further flesh-out these relationships and explain the trends in the quantitative
results.

Recommendations for Further Study
This study has evoked further questions regarding the nature of the
relationship between disease burden and both civil liberties and civil society. First,
how do impacts on civil liberties and civil society change as medical technology
develops? As vaccines and treatments become increasingly accessible, will this
impact these health-governance relationships? Second, as both physical
infrastructure (hospitals, personnel, equipment, etc.) and preparedness
infrastructure (response plan, international health regulations, etc.) further
develop, will health crises and heightened disease burdens hold different
implications for civil liberties and civil society? Analyzing the various Ebola
outbreaks in West and Central Africa, and how government responses to them have
changed over time, might be a good place to start in answering this question.
Obviously, the outbreak of COVID-19 and its impact on democracy and
democratization will be an essential area of research as the international
community continues to fight this disease. COVID-19 has likely had ramifications
in terms of civil liberties and civil society, but it is too soon to determine what
exactly this disease’s long-term impact will be. Moreover, many nations across sub60

Saharan Africa have held elections during the COVID-19 pandemic or plan to have
elections in the near future. Analyzing how these elections and election cycles have
been impacted will be imperative in understanding COVID’s short-term and
potential long-term impact on democratization. However, as noted in the
introduction, evaluating democracy within African nations based on an electoral
measure has inherent problems due to the various electoral autocracies in power
across the continent.
In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, it has become increasingly important to
understand the potential impact of health crises and disease burdens (and a
government’s response to them) on the state of democracy around the world. By
identifying past relationships between particular kinds of diseases and
manifestations of democracy, we can establish a baseline from which to project our
expectations about the ways in which emerging diseases like COVID-19 will impact
the practice of democracy.
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Appendix A: Country Samples
Countries sampled for regression analysis
Cape Verde (402)
Sao Tome and Principe (403)
Guinea-Bissau (404)
Equatorial Guinea (411)
The Gambia (420)
Mali (432)
Senegal (433)
Benin (434)
Mauritania (435)
Niger (436)
Ivory Coast (437)
Guinea (438)
Burkina Faso (439)
Liberia (450)
Sierra Leone (451)
Ghana (452)
Togo (461)
Cameroon (471)
Nigeria (475)
Gabon (481)
Central African Republic (482)
Chad (483)
Republic of the Congo (484)

Democratic Republic of the Congo (490)
Uganda (500)
Kenya (501)
Tanzania (510)
Burundi (516)
Rwanda (517)
Djibouti (522)
Ethiopia (530)
Angola (540)
Mozambique (541)
Zambia (551)
Zimbabwe (552)
Malawi (553)
South Africa (560)
Namibia (565)
Lesotho (570)*
Botswana (571)
Eswatini (572)
Madagascar (580)
Comoros (581)
Mauritius (590)*
Seychelles (591)*
Sudan (625)

*Not included for malaria analysis
Country code (ccode) included in parentheses
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Appendix B: Random Effects Models
Civil Liberties
VARIABLES

Change in Civil Liberties

HIV Rate (lag)

0.020
(0.118)
0.165***
(0.026)
-0.014***
(0.005)
0.070
(0.044)

—
—
—
—
-0.010*
(0.006)
0.043
(0.047)

—
—
—
—
-0.012**
(0.005)
0.042
(0.044)

—
—
—
—
-0.013***
(0.005)
0.065
(0.044)

—
—
—
—
-0.006
(0.006)
0.051
(0.045)

0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(0.000)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

(0.000)
0.030
(0.036)
0.001
(0.027)
—
—
—
—
—
—

(0.000)
—
—
—
—
-19.957
(51.540)
—
—
—
—

(0.000)
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.122
(0.078)
1.197***
(0.413)

(0.000)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

0.000
(0.000)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

—

—

—

—

1.176

—

—

—

—

—

(0.958)

—

—

—

—

—

0.520

—

—

—

—

—

(0.451)

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Lower Respiratory
Infection Rate (change)

—

—

—

—

—

Constant

—
0.952***
(0.046)

—
1.097***
(0.057)

—
1.113***
(0.038)

—
-0.093
(0.388)

—
0.525
(0.452)

0.657**
(0.302)
0.287
(0.297)

1,095
43

1,173
46

1,173
46

1,173
46

1,169
46

HIV Rate Change
GDP per capita (ln)
GDP Growth
Total Natural Resource
Rents (% of GDP)
Malaria Rate (lag)
Malaria Rate Change
Ebola Rate (lag)
Tuberculosis Rate (lag)
Tuberculosis Rate Change
Other Infectious Disease
Rate (lag)
Other Infectious Disease
Rate Change
Lower Respiratory
Infection Rate (lag)

Observations
1,173
Number of ccode
46
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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—
—
—
—
-0.003
(0.005)
0.064
(0.044)

51.852***
(11.084)

Civil Society
VARIABLES

Change in Civil Society Participation

HIV Rate (lag)

0.111
(0.152)
0.213***
(0.036)
-0.020***
(0.007)
0.129**
(0.062)

—
—
—
—
-0.018**
(0.008)
0.092
(0.066)

—
—
—
—
-0.016**
(0.006)
0.093
(0.062)

—
—
—
—
-0.022***
(0.007)
0.131**
(0.062)

—
—
—
—
-0.010
(0.008)
0.108*
(0.063)

—
—
—
—
-0.007
(0.007)
0.119*
(0.063)

0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(0.000)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

(0.001)
0.005
(0.046)
0.002
(0.038)
—
—
—
—
—
—

(0.000)
—
—
—
—
-23.135
(72.496)
—
—
—
—

(0.000)
—
—
—
—
—
—
-0.077
(0.105)
2.475***
(0.567)

(0.001)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

(0.001)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

—

—

—

—

0.920

—

—

—

—

—

(1.265)

—

—

—

—

—

0.912

—

—

—

—

—

(0.630)

—

—

—

—

—

—

53.832***

HIV Rate Change
GDP per capita (ln)
GDP Growth
Total Natural Resource
Rents (% of GDP)
Malaria Rate (lag)
Malaria Rate Change
Ebola Rate (lag)
Tuberculosis Rate (lag)
Tuberculosis Rate Change
Other Infectious Disease
Rate (lag)
Other Infectious Disease
Rate Change
Lower Respiratory
Infection Rate (lag)

—

—

—

—

—

(14.883)

Lower Respiratory
Infection Rate (change)

—

—

—

—

—

0.691

Constant

—
0.945***
(0.060)

—
1.162***
(0.075)

—
1.148***
(0.050)

—
-1.216**
(0.532)

—
0.180
(0.631)

(0.422)
0.285
(0.413)

1,095
43

1,173
46

1,173
46

1,173
46

1,169
46

Observations
1,173
Number of ccode
46
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix C: Fixed Effects Models
Civil Liberties
VARIABLES

Change in Civil Liberties

HIV Rate (lag)

-0.020
(0.268)
0.185***
(0.033)
-0.014
(0.014)
0.078*
(0.045)

—
—
—
—
-0.025
(0.016)
0.050
(0.048)

—
—
—
—
-0.038***
(0.014)
0.052
(0.045)

—
—
—
—
-0.001
(0.017)
0.054
(0.045)

—
—
—
—
0.029
(0.018)
0.056
(0.045)

-0.001*

-0.001**

-0.002**

-0.001*

-0.001*

(0.001)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

(0.001)
0.223**
(0.090)
-0.001
(0.027)
—
—
—
—
—
—

(0.001)
—
—
—
—
-42.772
(53.217)
—
—
—
—

(0.001)
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.454***
(0.157)
0.646
(0.579)

(0.001)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

-0.001*
(0.001)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

—

—

—

—

15.405***

—

—

—

—

—

(2.768)

—

—

—

—

—

0.685

—

—

—

—

—

(0.484)

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Lower Respiratory
Infection Rate Change

—

—

—

—

—

Constant

—
0.945***
(0.124)

—
1.188***
(0.126)

—
1.336***
(0.108)

—
0.270
(0.563)

—
-0.221
(0.504)

0.863***
(0.327)
-0.277
(0.360)

Observations
R-squared
Number of ccode

1,173
0.048
46

1,095
0.017
43

1,173
0.013
46

1,173
0.027
46

1,173
0.042
46

1,169
0.046
46

HIV Rate Change
GDP per capita (ln)
GDP Growth
Total Natural Resource
Rents (% of GDP)
Malaria Rate (lag)
Malaria Rate Change
Ebola Rate (lag)
Tuberculosis Rate (lag)
Tuberculosis Rate Change
Other Infectious Disease
Rate (lag)
Other Infectious Disease
Rate Change
Lower Respiratory
Infection Rate (lag)

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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—
—
—
—
0.034*
(0.019)
0.059
(0.045)

98.730***
(18.128)

Civil Society
VARIABLES

Change in Civil Society Participation

HIV Rate (lag)

0.754**
(0.382)
0.299***
(0.048)
-0.013
(0.021)
0.153**
(0.064)

—
—
—
—
-0.030
(0.022)
0.105
(0.068)

—
—
—
—
-0.043**
(0.020)
0.111*
(0.065)

—
—
—
—
0.000
(0.024)
0.121*
(0.064)

—
—
—
—
0.031
(0.026)
0.117*
(0.064)

—
—
—
—
0.054**
(0.027)
0.116*
(0.064)

-0.001
(0.001)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

-0.002*
(0.001)
0.209
(0.127)
-0.004
(0.039)
—
—
—
—
—
—

-0.002*
(0.001)
—
—
—
—
-18.729
(75.668)
—
—
—
—

-0.001
(0.001)
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.343
(0.223)
2.407***
(0.822)

-0.002
(0.001)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

-0.002
(0.001)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

1.138
(0.692)

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Lower Respiratory
Infection Rate Change

—

—

—

—

—

Constant

—
0.802***
(0.176)

—
1.235***
(0.179)

—
1.379***
(0.154)

—
-1.440*
(0.798)

—
-0.722
(0.720)

1.048**
(0.466)
-0.682
(0.513)

Observations
R-squared
Number of ccode

1,173
0.044
46

1,095
0.011
43

1,173
0.009
46

1,173
0.027
46

1,173
0.029
46

1,169
0.039
46

HIV Rate Change
GDP per capita (ln)
GDP Growth
Total Natural Resource
Rents (% of GDP)
Malaria Rate (lag)
Malaria Rate Change
Ebola Rate (lag)
Tuberculosis Rate (lag)
Tuberculosis Rate Change
Other Infectious Disease
Rate (lag)
Other Infectious Disease
Rate Change
Lower Respiratory
Infection Rate (lag)

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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16.972***
(3.955)

—
—
—
—
133.829***
(25.828)
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